We integrate a widely accepted version of the separation of ownership and controlJensen's (1986) free cash flow theory -into a dynamic equilibrium model and study the effect of imperfect corporate control on asset prices and investment. Aggregate free cash flow of the corporate sector is an important state variable in explaining asset prices, investment, and the cyclical behavior of interest rates and the yield curve. The financial friction causes cash-flow shocks to affect investment, and causes otherwise i.i.d. shocks to be transmitted from period to period. The shocks propagate through large firms and during booms.
Introduction
We study the implications of imperfect corporate control for equilibrium investment and asset prices. In standard neoclassical models of investment and asset pricing, managers (implicitly) act in shareholders' interests, maximizing firm value. Managers rank projects by net present value, and only undertake projects with positive net present value. Thus investment decisions are taken as if a representative shareholder/consumer is running the firm, and the separation of ownership and control has no consequences.
In practice, however, shareholders have imperfect control over the decisions of the management of a firm. Because of the separation between ownership and control (first identified by Berle and Means (1932) ) 1 agency problems arise and managers may choose projects that, while in their own interests, do not maximize firm value. Investors try to align the incentives of managers with their own goals through corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., independent directors on the board, charters that facilitate the market for corporate control, bank monitors, etc.) and through financial contracts (the firm's capital structure, executive compensation incentive contracts, etc.) Nevertheless, corporate control frictions remain a problem.
We integrate a widely accepted version of the separation of owership and controlJensen's (1986) free cash flow theory -into an otherwise standard dynamic equilibrium model and study the effect of imperfect corporate control on asset prices and investment.
We assume that firms are run by empire-building managers who prefer to invest all free cash flow rather than distributing it to shareholders. Our corporate finance approach suggests that the aggregate free cash flow of the corporate sector is an important state variable in explaining asset prices and investment.
First, we show that the introduction of the imperfect corporate control friction can improve the standard model's ability to explain some asset pricing regularities. We show that the business cycle variation in free cash flow helps to explain the cyclical behavior of interest rates and the yield curve. The stochastic variation in free cash flow also sheds light on risk premia on corporate bonds and out-of-the-money put options. Our paper is a step in the direction of incorporating a theory of corporate finance into equilibrium asset pricing.
Second, we show that the financial friction causes cash-flow shocks to affect investment, and causes otherwise i.i.d. shocks to be transmitted from period to period. In this regard, our model's implications accord with that of the existing macroeconomics literature on
1 Also see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) who emphasize another control problem, namely, that minority shareholders often have no ability to control dominant shareholders. Stein (2001) surveys the literature.
financial frictions (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ).
One important difference between our work and the existing literature is that we study the frictions caused by imperfect corporate control and empire-building managers. The existing literature has focused mostly on costly external finance, where shocks propagate through small firms and in recessions. In contrast, shocks propagate through large firms and during booms in our model.
The model we present integrates Jensen's (1986 Jensen's ( , 1993 free cash flow theory, with a widely used equilibrium asset pricing model, that of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (hereafter, CIR) (1985) . Free cash flow is the total return from operations net of contractual payments to investors. In Jensen's theory, managers are empire builders: they always want to invest as much as possible, and will not release cash to the shareholders unless forced to do so. 2 Shareholders attempt to control managerial decision-making through costly monitoring (Jensen focuses on leverage as a device to force managers to release cash to investors), but they cannot perfectly control their managers. In our model, the aggregate free cash flow in the corporate sector arises as an important state variable. Since managers exercise control over the free cash flow, this state variable measures the severity of the corporate control problem.
As in CIR, we assume a constant-returns-to-scale production process with a stochastically evolving productivity parameter. Unlike CIR, the production technology in our model is not directly operated by consumers, but instead is run by an empire-building manager.
We model the limitations on the ability of investors to control the firm's investment and payout policy. We assume that a costly auditing/monitoring technology is available to investors. Payouts are costly in proportion to the size of the payout. Each period investors hire some number of auditors, at a cost, to monitor the firm. The auditors have a technology to seize output and then transfer the resources back to consumers. However, each auditor can be responsible for only a limited amount of output. Thus, if the realized output is unusually high, the firm will retain some earnings. The manager invests this free cash flow, along with any new infusions from consumers. The next period, consumers again 2 The idea that managers are "empire-builders" has a fairly long history; e.g., see Baumol (1959) , Marris (1964) , Williamson (1964) , and Donaldson (1984) . There have been a number of empirical tests of the free cash flow hypothesis. Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1991) find that when an acquiring firm in a merger has a low value of Tobin's q, and relatively high cash flows, the announcement effect is negative. Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994) look at a small sample of firms that receive a windfall amount of cash in a legal settlement. The firms in their sample have low values of q, but still the managers do not return the cash to the shareholders. Other examples include Lang and Litzenberger (1989) and Mann and Sicherman (1991) .
choose some number of auditors to hire, and so on. The critical feature of the model is that investment is chosen not only based on expected productivity, but also in part based on any free cash flow retained from past production.
A basic prediction of models that have formalized Jensen's ideas is that investors force release of free cash flow by requiring the firm to increase leverage. Debt is a "hard claim"
because managers must meet debt payments or face ouster (see, for example, Stulz (1990) , Harris and Raviv (1990) , Hart and Moore (1995) , and Zweibel (1996) ). In our model, the firm's output is only released to investors by employing auditors. Thus our auditing technology works similarly to the hard claim of debt, but more broadly represents a variety of control mechanisms (e.g., debt, hostile takeovers, leverage buyouts, a change of board membership or charter and so on).
Our results contrast with those of a standard business cycle model, such as CIR, where asset prices and investment are driven by changes in the expected marginal rate of transformation (productivity). For example, the CIR account of the procyclical interest rate is that cyclical movements in productivity drive it. This seems very unrealistic for the short rate. 3 In our model, the corporate control problem means that when free cash flow is high, investment may be higher than shareholders would optimally prefer. While shareholders can extract more resources from the firm, this will only occur in the future. The result is that shareholders can end up holding "too many" financial claims on the corporate sector and to induce them to do this, interest rates will have to be high. Thus when free cash flow is high, as in a cyclical peak, investment demand is high, and therefore interest rates are high. Likewise, the model generates a term spread with the well-known leading indicator property.
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The variation in the corporate control problem over the business cycle also has implications for risk premia. The distinctive feature of our model is that investors are effectively "debt-holders" on the productive sector: They bear downside risk, but do not fully share in the upside risk, as in these states managers exercise control over free cash flow. This means that securities that match this pattern of payoffs have high risk premia. Corporate bonds 3 The same issue arises in the standard real business cycle model. Large productivity shocks are needed at fairly short intervals to quantitatively account for business cycle fluctuations. Many macroeconomists have criticized this as unreasonable, and researchers have sought amplifications mechanisms whereby small shocks can have large effects. Mechanisms involving aspects of corporate net worth or retained earnings have been studied by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . 4 The procyclical real interest rate, as well as behavior of the yield curve, may also be driven by countercyclical monetary policy. However, as is widely appreciated in the literature, monetary policy is endogenous and driven by expectations of private sector activity. At an extreme, our model might say that the monetary authority simply chooses the money supply so that the interbank rate aligns with our "real" interest rate.
have high risk premia. Out of the money put options also have high risk premia, so that implied volatilities on options match the empirically observed volatility "smirk." Finally, we show that equity securities exhibit mean reversion in returns.
The model's implications for quantities are also in line with business cycle facts. Aggregate investment and free cash flow are positively correlated. Also, investment is more volatile than consumption. Because of the financial friction, production shocks are amplified and otherwise i.i.d. shocks persist beyond a period. All of these implications are consistent with the macroeconomic literature on financial frictions (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ). One important difference between our work and the existing literature is that we study the frictions caused by imperfect corporate control and empire-building managers. The existing literature has focused mostly on costly external finance. Casual empiricism suggests that the costly external finance problem arises more for small firms, while the corporate control problem arises for large firms. To the extent that both models imply a relation between investment and cash-flow our paper reinforces the existing results. On the other hand, our model suggests that shocks should propagate through the investment spending of large firms. We provide some empirical support for this prediction based on the behavior of large firms across the business cycle and argue that our effects are likely to be quantitatively significant.
There is a growing asset pricing literature that explicitly incorporates the production side. Cochrane (1991), Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2001),
and Holmstrom and Tirole (2001) are examples of papers in this literature. In some of these papers it is the marginal rate of transformation of the firm that is the central focus.
But the separation of ownership and control will generally mean that this marginal rate of transformation will not be equal to the cost of capital for a firm. Holmstrom and Zhang reach the negative conclusion that unless financing frictions are procyclical, they play a limited role in explaining asset prices.
In the macroeconomics literature, two other recent papers have investigated the effect of imperfect control for investment. Danthine and Donaldson (2003) study a model where, because of imperfect contracting, managers bear a substantial amount of the risk of the investment that is undertaken within their firms. They show how this distorts investment, leading to the possibility of both over-and under-investment. They also show that their model generates a correlation between cash-flow and investment. Philippon (2003) presents a model in which firms over-invest because of managerial tendencies to empire-build. As in our paper there is a business cycle variation in the degree of the corporate control friction.
The mechanism that he emphasizes is that governance is weaker during booms because investors find it optimal to give firms some more slack in these periods.
In the next section we describe the economy and present the solution to a planning problem for the economy. Then we discuss decentralization and interpret the solution in terms of the pricing kernel. In Sections 4 and 5 we present the asset pricing implications of our model. In Section 6 we discuss the investment implications of our imperfect control model, contrasting these implications with that of a costly-external finance model. We present further empirical support for our approach in this section. The conclusion and an appendix follows.
The model

Preferences and Technology
We consider an infinite horizon discrete time economy with a single consumption good.
There is a unit measure of consumers with preferences at time t of,
There is a constant returns to scale production technology available each period that converts one unit of consumption good at time t into z t+1 units of goods at time t + 1. z t+1 is a random variable that is distributed as follows:
ρ t+1 is a state variable that represents the expected productivity of investment. It is known at time t, i.e. when investment occurs. The productivity state variable evolves as follows,
where,
We introduce a free-cash-flow friction to arrive at asset pricing implications of the separation of ownership and control. Managers, not consumers, control corporate assets and, in particular, make investment decisions. The preferences of the manager are those of an "empire-builder," in the spirit of Jensen (1986) . That is, the manager prefers to invest all available corporate resources so as to maximize firm size. Shareholders have only one lever to control this investment. When they invest in the firm at time t, they simultaneously choose a number of "auditors" to hire for the upcoming period. Auditors have a technology to observe goods as they are produced and then to ring fence these produced goods so they do not fall under the control of the empire-building manager. However, each auditor can only be responsible for a maximum of one unit of the good. Moreover, hiring an auditor is costly, as auditors consume a fraction 1 − γ of the goods they seize.
Hiring more auditors means that, in expectation, investors will receive higher payouts next period. In effect, investors choose the auditors depending on how large a payout they would like next period. For this reason, we refer to the hiring of auditors as the payout policy.
At date t − 1 the investors hand over some resources to the manager. The manager adds this to retained earnings from past production and, given his empire-building tendencies, invests all of it in production (amounting to I t−1 Our strategy for characterizing asset prices is three-fold: (1) In the next two sub-sections we determine (C t , d t+1 ) as solutions to a planning problem; (2) Then we briefly discuss how the planning solution may be decentralized; (3) Finally, the solution to the planning problem is used to derive a pricing kernel that will allow us to price the various assets of interest.
We consider a planner who only maximizes the welfare of the consumer, while being constrained to operate production under the friction of separation of ownership and con- 
Discussion
The CIR benchmark is achieved when we set γ = 1. In this case it is costless for investors to hire auditors and as a result they have full control of the firm's investment policies. Relative to CIR, we have made a significant simplification by eliminating the correlation between ν t and t . This removes some of the richness in their interest rate dynamics, but it helps focus purely on the cash flow effects.
Macroeconomics models of investment make the realistic assumption that capital depreciates only partially each period. On the other hand, in the CIR model capital depreciates fully each period. An alternative interpretation is that capital does not depreciate, but can be costlessly transformed back into consumption goods. We also make this assumption.
We adopt the perspective that the consumers (outside claimants) choose payout policy.
In practice, managers do not just exercise their power by controlling investment. They also influence the firms' capital structure and dividend policy in ways that may not be aligned 
The planning problem
The planner chooses consumption and payout policy to solve:
I t is period t investment by the firm, and W t is the period t remunerations to consumers,
We now move to a recursive representation of this problem. Given C t , period t investment by the firm is
For future reference we define retained earnings per unit of capital as,
Thus it should be clear that investment at date t is just retained earnings from last period plus new injections of funds from investors. Substituting the expression for W t into the investment equation (4) gives,
Investment this period is equal to resources produced from last period's investment minus audit costs minus consumption.
The investment equation can be written more concisely as,
is a "transformed" version of actual production returns, z t . It is the actual production returns minus a term representing the audit costs associated with the payout policy. Equivalently, it is the return from the point of view of the consumer.
Our assumptions on the auditing technology impose the following key friction: investors can only make positive infusions so as to increase resources available for investment. This is equivalent to saying that,
Note that the only case in which this constraint will bind is when z t > d t and there is too much retained earnings in the firm so that the investor would ideally like to have some of this back in terms of consumption.
During period t investors choose how much to consume and payout policy for period t + 1. The consumption decision, along with past investment decisions and decisions over payout policy, leads to a new level of capital at the end of period t (see equation (6)).
Investors make these decisions knowing ρ t+1 (expected productivity from t to t + 1). Let J(I t , ρ t+1 ) be the expected value of I t units of capital at the start of date t + 1, given ρ t+1 .
The recursive representation of our problem is,
given the investment accumulation equation (6) and subject to the constraint (8).
Proposition 1 The solution to the problem, (9), is as follows. Investment and new capital
are:
Consumption is:
and total required payouts are:
where θ is a constant, and y t is defined in (7) .
Proof: See the Appendix. Aggregate consumption (per unit of I t−1 ) resembles a put-option on the date-t output of y t . It is linear in y t upto a point and then is flat. Investment is the difference between the date-t output and consumption. It is also linear in y t but then turns sharply steeper at the point where consumption flattens out.
We refer to the region to the right of point B as the over-investment region and the region to the left of point B as the optimal-investment region. In the former region, relative to consumers' preferred choices, firms are over-investing because of the manager's empire building preferences. In the latter region, consumers control investment and investment is optimal. 
Lemma 1 (CIR Case)
When γ = 1, the economy collapses to the CIR model. Investment and consumption are as follows:
Proof: When γ = 1, there is no cost of increasing θ, and thus claimholders may as well set θ → ∞. Then y t = z t and from the equations of Proposition 1,
3 Aggregate quantities and pricing kernel
Investment and consumption
Investment in our model is a function of current corporate cash-flow as well as last period's investment. The correlation between investment and cash-flow is fairly well documented, and is a natural prediction of models with financial frictions. The cash-flow shock only lasts one-period in our model because, upon the realization of unusually high cash flow at date t, investors simply increase the payout policy for period t + 1 (see equation (12)). It may be interesting to study a model in which the intervention technology had more lags, as this will lead to richer dynamics of shocks.
Macroeconomic models with financial frictions such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) also predict these sorts of effects for aggregate investment. One important difference between our model and the existing literature is that our effects arise from free-cash-flow problems as opposed to costly external finance. In the corporate finance literature, both types of frictions have received equal attention. Our paper is one of the first to point out the implications of free-cash-flow problems for aggregate quantities (see also Philippon, 2003 ).
In the costly external finance model, frictions get worse during downturns. In the freecash-flow model, frictions get worse during booms (although, the effects of over-investment during booms is perhaps most apparent during downturns). Our model predicts that investment is more responsive to cash flow during booms, as opposed to downturns. In fact, comparing equations (10) to equation (14) we see that the main kick in our model is on the positive shocks. Investment in our model is a convex function of shocks. Casually, our model seems to fit stories regarding accelerating liquidity and investment during booms.
These effects can be empirically tested and distinguished. However, we think of our model as a complement rather than a subsitute to the costly external finance models. They probably work in different types of firms. In the corporate finance literature, free-cashflow problems have been mostly associated with large firms, while costly external finance problems have been associated with smaller firms. Thus these two types of models have different implications for which types of firms propagate aggregate shocks. We return to this discussion in Section 6 where we present some empirical support for our approach.
The convexity of investment as a function of shocks also implies that consumption is a concave function of shocks (see Figure 1) . It is easy to show that this also implies that consumption is a concave function of measures of wealth/liquidity. Since Keynes, the concavity of the consumption function has been viewed as a desirable property of models.
In the consumption literature, models with precautionary savings motives have been shown to generate the concave consumption function (e.g., see Gourinchas and Parker, 2002) . Our model does so because of the free-cash-flow problem.
Decentralization and the pricing kernel
One possible decentralization of the planning solution of the previous section is as follows.
At date t, all claimholders of the firm have a meeting in which they decide on resources to inject into the firm for that period and on the payout policy/number of auditors to hire for the following period. Since the claimholders are identical, the policy will be approved unanimously. The manager then invests the firm's retained earnings plus any additional resources infused by the claimholders. Consumers are then free to trade a full set of contingent claims against all possible realizations of output. Between t and t + 1, auditors observe and seize the designated amount of output goods, and then return them to claimholders.
Finally, any contingent claims that are bought or sold between consumers are settled, and consumption takes place.
Since consumers can trade a full set of contingent claims against all output realizations (and consumers do not face any commitment problems or other financial frictions), the pricing kernel can be defined in terms of the marginal rate of substitution of the representative consumer,
Note that although we have modeled more explicitly the production side of the economy, the model's implications for asset prices still derive from the marginal rate of substitution of the representative consumer. In the equilibrium asset pricing literature, measured aggregate consumption is used as a proxy for C t , and the smoothness of aggregate consumption poses a problem for reconciling asset returns. Likewise, our model's implications for C t , proxied for by measured aggregate consumption, are likely to be rejected by the data.
However, it is well understood that the failures of the standard consumption based asset pricing model could be driven by the difficulty of identifying the marginal investor in asset markets and measuring his marginal rate of substitution. Aggregate consumption is not a valid proxy when there is limited market participation. One approach to this problem is to measure the consumption of a smaller sample of stockholders (see Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991, or Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) . While some progress has been made via this approach, the difficulty of measurement in consumer data makes the estimates very noisy (see VissingJorgensen, 2002, for a discussion of these points).
We view our methodology as complementary to the limited-market participation lit-
erature. An alternative way to arrive at the consumption of stockholders is to write an economic model of the production side of the economy, and infer the transfers from the productive sector to these stockholders. The implications of these transfers can be inferred from their effects on asset prices, without explicitly identifying the relevant consumption flows. Granted the inference is gained only through the economic model. However, for empirical work, data from the production side may be better and offer a substantive alternative to the consumption-based models. We think this advantage is sufficient to warrant further investigation. Thus, we view the C t in the pricing kernel of equation (15) as corresponding to the consumption of participants in the asset market, as opposed to measured aggregate consumption.
Term structure
We begin our characterization of asset prices by computing the riskless short term interest rate, and then move on to describe the entire riskless yield curve. Our main interest is in describing the cyclical behavior of interest rates and term spreads and their correlation with aggregate investment and free-cash-flow.
Short rate
It is helpful to define,
and rewrite the pricing kernel as,
Interest rates are:
.
Proposition 2 (Short rate)
There are two regimes depending on the relative magnitudes of y t (1 − β) and ρ t γθ. In the case where y t (1 − β) < ρ t γθ -that is the optimal-investment region -the short rate is:
In the case where y t (1 − β) ≥ ρ t γθ -the over-investment region -the short rate is:
A little algebra verifies that interest rates coincide at the boundary between these two regions. The short rate has a simple expression then: it is only a function of e t (realized retained earnings from (5)) and ρ t+1 (a proxy for expected production returns). If earnings are unexpectedly high, interest rates are high; if not they are just proportional to ρ t+1 , the expected production returns for the next period.
Note that ψ in the interest rate expression in Proposition 2 is a function of γ. If we take the limiting case of γ = 1, then we arrive at the CIR model:
Lemma 2 (CIR Short rate)
The short rate in the case where γ = 1 coincides with the CIR short rate:
Proof: When γ = 1, θ → ∞. Thus, y t = z t and ψ t = (1 − β) zt ρt . From Proposition 2, if θ is large, the short rate expression for the region to the left of point B (see (18) ) applies:
Comparison of the interest rate expressions in the Proposition 2 and Lemma 2 reveals precisely the difference between our model and CIR. First, in the optimal-investment region, the expressions for interest rates are similar. Expected productivity drives all stochastic variation in the interest rate. The only difference is that the value of E[ψ −1 ] is higher in the free-cash-flow model, which means the average level of interest rates is slightly lower. In the over-investment region, shocks to both productivity as well as retained earnings drive interest rates.
We can illustrate these economic effects using a static loanable funds model. Consider first Figure 2 , which represents the CIR model. On the horizontal axis is investment or loans. On the vertical axis is the interest rate. Consumers' supply of loanable funds is upward-sloping in the interest rate. The demand for funds is perfectly elastic at a level determined by the expected productivity of investment (ρ t+1 ). A shock to ρ t+1 shifts up both the demand and supply curves. In the log case, the shift is of the same amount so that investment remains unchanged (see Proposition 1), but the interest rate rises by the amount of the shock. A shock to expected productivity moves both supply and demand curves up and shifts equilibrium from point A to point B. The net effect on the interest rate is the same as in the CIR case ( Figure 2 ). There is also a shock to retained earnings. But it has no effect on the equilibrium in this region.
The right-hand panel illustrates the effect of these shocks when the retained earnings shock is large enough to take the economy into the over-investment region. At the margin, managers invest all of their retained earnings. Thus interest rates rise not only because of the rise in expected productivity, but also to induce investors to accept the higher required savings level. Plausibly, at business cycle frequencies, shocks to earnings are much larger than shocks to expected productivity. An asset pricing model such as CIR links all cyclical variation in interest rates just to variation in ρ t+1 , as can be seen in the diagram. However, in the over-investment region of the free-cash-flow model, large shocks to retained earnings have large effects on interest rates. Thus a success of the free-cash-flow model is that it links cyclical variation in retained earnings to the short rate: When retained earnings are high, as in a cyclical peak, the short rate is also high; When retained earnings are low, the short rate is low.
The CIR model reconciles the data by positing a correlation structure in the underlying productivity shocks. For example, ρ t is typically a mean-reverting process in CIR. Of course, this is just by assumption. Our model isolates how otherwise i.i.d. shocks when combined with the free-cash-flow friction result in a mean reverting interest rate process. We have focused on the i.i.d. case in order to make this point most clearly.
Our mechanism of retained earnings and investment demand as being the driving force for the procyclical interest rate is also in contrast to the standard consumption asset pricing model (e.g, the habit formation models of Constantinides, 1990 , Sundaresan, 1989 , and Campbell and Cochrane, 1999 . There, the procyclical interest rate is often rationalized as follows. Fixing equity investment opportunities, if investors receive a negative income shock (i.e. cyclical trough), they will have higher risk aversion, consequently the risk premium will be higher and the interest rate will be lower in the trough.
If one introduces production opportunities into the consumption/endowment economies common in the asset pricing literature, then consumers will have a strong desire to smooth consumption via the production technology. Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) make this point in reference to habit formation preferences. If the production technology is modeled as in CIR, then the marginal rate of transformation will determine interest rates (as in CIR). We see our model as providing one avenue to introduce production into the standard endowment economies and break the strong link between the marginal rate of transformation and asset prices.
Slope of the yield curve
In order to study the slope of the yield curve, we now derive the expression for the τ -period interest rate.
Lemma 3 (Long-rate)
The τ -period interest rate is:
Proof: See the Appendix.
For τ large the long term interest rate from (22) is approximately,
The last term is a constant that is linear in τ . Thus productivity is the primary determinant of long term interest rates. This is the same as in the CIR model. 
Proposition 3 (Term spread)
The term spread measured as (long -short) is:
Since changes in ρ t+1 have the same effect on both long and short rates, productivity changes have no effects on the term spread. In our free-cash-flow model, all movements in the term spread are driven by variation in retained earnings.
The retained earnings effect on the short rate lasts only one period. As previously noted, this is because in the period following a big retained earnings innovation, investors will hire sufficient auditors to reduce the free-cash-flow problem. Our intuition is that if the free-cash-flow problem took longer to resolve so that firms were over-investing for several periods, there would be persistence beyond one period.
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Another mechanism to arrive at persistence is to suppose that capital did not depreciate fully and was irreversible. There is a large investment literature which makes the case for this friction at the level of an individual firm (see Caballero, 1999, Abel and Eberly, 1996, Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). We can imagine introducing this additional feature into our model. Initially, a high retained earnings shock leads firms to over-invest. If this leads to a persistently larger than optimal capital stock, the interest rate would have to remain high in order to induce investors to hold the larger capital stock. On the other hand, such persistence would also lead to zero net investment over a number of periods, which is clearly counterfactual. For this reason, the investment literature has only been concerned with micro-level irreversibility.
It is also instructive to compare our effect to what would arise in a model with physical irreversibility in capital investment, but without our free-cash-flow friction. This is interesting because our over-investment problem seems similar to a model of physical irreversibility, but with the following difference. In our model, the free-cash-flow problem means that investors are unable to reduce firm investment below the high level chosen by the manager.
With physical irreversibility, investors are unable to reduce investment below zero.
Suppose that the CIR model was modified to have irreversible physical capital. In that model, the constraint will bind following a negative realization of output -as opposed to a positive realization of output, as in our free-cash-flow model. Agents would like to consume part of their physical capital, but can not. In order to make them hold the physical capital, interest rates would have to rise. Thus high interest rates would coincide with low output realizations (troughs). This is counterfactual.
Risk premia
We consider the implications of our kernel for the pricing of risky securities. The distinctive feature of our model is that the free-cash-flow friction leaves consumers as "debt-holders" on the productive sector. This creates an asymmetry in the pricing kernel. We show that the asymmetry helps us to rationalize high corporate bond spreads, as well as mean reversion in stock returns and the volatility smirk of equity index options.
To begin, we note that the debt and equity securities we price are derivative securities.
We price zero net-supply securities whose payoff is some function of y t . These securities can be interpreted as claims issued by one of the consumers with a payoff indexed to GDP at date t. Since the consumers have no commitment problems or other financial frictions, the claims they issue can be valued using standard pricing kernel methods.
Since the claims we price are in zero net-supply, they do not correspond to the claim on the single "firm" in our economy (this would be a claim whose payoff resembled a debt security). The primary reason we take our route is that the value of capital in our model is always one. In the optimal-investment region, since investors lend consumption goods to be transformed into capital using a constant-returns-to-scale technology, the price of capital is fixed at one. In the over-investment region, this logic does fail. However, since investor preferences are log, the income and substitution effects exactly cancel and again the price of capital is one. Thus, the claim on the firm will never show capital gains in our economy (although dividends will be state dependent). This is an unappealing feature of the model, but is the price we pay for simplicity. We discuss the issue further in the conclusion.
Corporate bond spreads
Let us consider pricing a one-period derivative security whose payoff is as follows:
This is a corporate bond of one dollar of face on a company whose value next period is perfectly correlated with aggregate output. F is the default point on the bond. Its price today is just,
We can likewise price a riskless bond giving a price of
. Define the spread between the corporate and riskless bonds as,
Note that this is somewhat unusual in that we look at the ratio of two bond prices as opposed to the difference in the reciprocals of the two prices. While in the data these two measures of the spread will be almost identical, in our analytical model this is the natural definition for analytical tractability.
We can rewrite the spread in a standard single-beta representation as follows (see Cochrane, 2001 ):
where
] is the risk premium associated with holding the pricing kernel. The spread is compensation for both the chance of default as well a risk premium for the loading of corporate bond defaults on the pricing kernel. Thus, the β is the coefficient on a regression of the corporate bond payoff on the pricing kernel:
If agents were risk neutral so that the pricing kernel was linear, then S t would be a pure default premium (i.e. 1 − E t [P t+1 ]). Since both 1 − P t+1 and m t+1 are decreasing functions of y t+1 , the correlation coefficient is positive. This means that the β is positive and the risk premium component of the spread is also positive. We have chosen to focus on a corporate bond whose payoff is only composed of aggregate risk, because this maximizes the risk premium component of the spread.
We are going to contrast this spread when bonds are valued under both the free-cash-flow pricing kernel and the CIR pricing kernel. The two pricing kernels are just,
and,
m CIR t+1 can also be obtained by setting θ to infinity in m CF t+1 . At time t all of the variables with the exception of ρ t+1 ψ t+1 and y t+1 are known. Thus, the β-expression can be rewritten as, (1-β) y t+1 F γθρ t+1 ρ t+1 ψ t+1 1 -P t+1 Figure 4 graphs ρ t+1 ψ t+1 and y t+1 along with 1 − P t+1 . Note that ρ t+1 ψ t+1 is equal to (1 − β)y t+1 in the optimal investment region, and uniformly less in the over-investment region. More importantly, ρ t+1 ψ t+1 is more correlated with 1 − P t+1 than is (1 − β)y t+1 .
This implies that the correlation term is higher under the free-cash-flow pricing kernel than the CIR kernel.
From the figure we can also see that the volatility of the free-cash-flow kernel is lower than the CIR kernel. This implies that the β is higher under the free-cash-flow kernel than the CIR kernel.
Whether this translates into a higher corporate bond spread depends on what happens to the risk premium on the pricing kernel (
]) across these two models. We have seen that σ(m t+1 ) and the interest rate are lower under the free-cash-flow kernel. This means that the risk premium is actually lower under the free-cash-flow kernel. Thus, the end result on corporate bond spreads is ambiguous.
We will discuss the risk premium on the kernel in more depth below. However, if we fix the risk premium across both the CIR and the free-cash-flow model, the β effect dominates.
In a model where investors have log preferences, the return on the wealth portfolio (i.e. market return) is the reciprocal of the return on the pricing kernel (see, e.g., Cochrane, 2001 ). Thus the experiment of fixing the risk premium is close to, but not exactly the same as, fixing the equity risk premium in the model.
Proposition 4 (Corporate spreads) Fixing the risk premium of the pricing kernel, the corporate bond spread is higher in the free-cash-flow model than in the CIR model.
Intuitively, investors in the free-cash-flow world face a friction that means they don't fully share the upside of good production returns. The friction leaves them looking like "debt-holders" on the aggregate economy. In this environment, debt securities match their risk more closely and as a result investors demand a higher risk premium on these securities.
The largest effect will occur for bonds whose default point (F ) is at the start of the over-investment region. Moreover the effect will have an inverse-U shape. This is a testable implication of the model. It says that a regression of the realized returns on corporate bonds versus the stock market would show the highest β's for bonds which default at the point where the yield curve changes from upward to downward sloping.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) find that firm-level variables have surprisingly little explanatory power for changes in corporate bond spreads. In contrast, macro variables, such as the return on the stock market, have much more explanatory power.
Our previous result provides one explanation for this finding. Strictly speaking the result implies that only the stock market return should affect corporate bond spreads. However, adding an idiosyncratic component to P t+1 will change that. More importantly, if we move away from log preferences, the pricing kernel will include both the stock market return as well as aggregate free-cash-flow. Thus free-cash-flow should also have explanatory power for changes in corporate bond spreads. This remains to be checked.
Stock returns: Mean reversion, volatility smirk and skewness
We now consider equity derivative securities whose payoff is linearly increasing in y t+1 .
We divide the time between t and t + 1 into a series of infinitesimally small intervals.
At each of these dates, agents can trade a full set of contingent claims against all output realizations at t + 1. We take the limit, so that trading occurs continuously between t and t + 1. Let s ∈ [t, t + 1] index time. Between t and t + 1, the information flow concerning output realizations is described by a filtration generated by a standard Brownian motion process, which we denote as {Z s }.
At each s, we consider pricing the security whose payoff at s = t +1 is P s = y t+1 . Notice that consumption does not take place until t + 1. Thus we price this risky security using the riskless bond (i.e. the security that pays one at t + 1) as the numeraire.
We have seen that the free-cash-flow pricing kernel is given by (23) . At time t, the only uncertainty in the pricing kernel of m t+1 is in y t+1 . For short, let us write this as,
where, A and D are constants, 7 and derive the price of the risky asset at time s, using the bond as numeraire, as
e. the actuarially fair price of the risky asset). Then,
It should be clear that the value of h(·) is less than or equal to one, implying that the risky asset has a positive risk premium. The result implies that good news about cash flows (P * s ) raises P s more than P * s , while bad news about cash flows causes P s to fall more than P * s . It also implies that there is mean reversion in stock returns. News that pushes down the stock price will lead to a higher conditional stock return, so that the negative return will be followed by a positive return.
Proposition 5 (Risk premium)
It is worth pointing out that in the CIR model with log investors, there would be no mean reversion. This is because h(·) will be constant, and not a function of P * s . The result is due to the free-cash-flow friction we have assumed.
The result that stock prices are more sensitive to news can also be stated in terms of volatilities. Both P s and P * s can be written as diffusions in Z s ( dPs Ps = µ s dt + σ s dZ s , and similarly for P * s ). If we apply Ito's Lemma to equation (26) and retain only the dZ s terms, we arrive at, represents the fraction of the volatility of the asset price that is due to the pricing kernel. That is, if m t+1 is constant, then h(·) will also be a constant (equal to one). This will mean that σ s = σ * s , so that the volatility of the asset price is due solely to changes in the conditional expectation of its payoff (y t+1 ).
Since we have shown than that ∂h ∂P * s is positive, it is straighforward that σ s ≥ σ * s . More interestingly, since for high values of P * s , we have that h(·) is constant, it follows that σ s equals σ * s for high values of P * s . This tells us that (subject to a caveat) volatility is higher
where, x is a random variable that is positive, has mean of one, and is independent of the information filtration at time s. Denote its distribution function as G(x). Then,
which verifies that Es[mt+1]P * s is increasing in P * s when the stock price is low than when it is high. 9
Out-of-the-money equity index put-options command higher implied volatilities than out-of-the-money call options (the "volatility smirk.") That is, the volatilities implied by the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model vary across different strike prices, for the same underlying asset. This pattern has been widely documented in the literature. For example, see Dupire (1994) and Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) . Bates (1996) provides a survey.
Our results provide an economic explanation for the smirk. Referring back to Figure 4 , we see that the Arrow-Debreu prices are high for low values of y t+1 , while they are equal to probabilities for high values of y t+1 . Alternatively, given investors debt-like claim on aggregate returns, they bear downside risk without sharing in upside risk. This implies that they have higher demand for put options than call options. Thus it is immediate that out-of-the-money puts will have higher implied volatilities than out-of-the-money calls.
Investment and Free Cash Flow
So far we have shown how incorporating an imperfect control friction into an otherwise standard asset pricing model can improve the standard model's ability to explain important asset pricing regularities. These results are supportive of our model, but remain qualitative.
Exactly how much of the risk premium on corporate bonds, for example, can be accounted for by our model will require a more realistic casting of our model. For example, we will have to alter preferences as well as the production technology (currently constant returns to scale) to match standard Real Business Cycle models. We leave this for future research.
Instead, in this section we provide some further empirical evidence in three dimensions.
First, we argue that the existing macroeconomics literature on financial frictions provides an incomplete account of the cash-flow/investment relationship. Second, we review the investment behavior of large firms and show that it is consistent with our imperfect control friction. We argue therefore that our friction can plausibly apply to a significant fraction of corporate investment undertaken in the U.S. Third, we review some disaggregated investment data that provides cross-sectional support for the investment implications of our model. 9 The caveat is as follows. In the CIR model with log preferences, σs is equal to σ * s . As P * s approaches zero, our free-cash-flow model approaches the CIR model. Thus the volatility relation is non-monotonic.
However, this non-monotonicity is due to the log preference assumption. In a range where the free-cash flow friction is the dominant concern, volatility will be decreasing in P * s .
Investment, financing constraints, and cash flow
The macroeconomics literature on financial frictions has for the most part focused on costly external finance problems with firms (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) for a review). In this literature, the firms appear to be small, entrepreneurial, firms with no outside equity. The friction in these models implies that when a firm is financially constrained, its investment is driven by internally generated cash flow. Hence, a success of this model is that it generates the correlation between cash flow and investment that is a regularity of the investment data.
But, there are several problems with this friction being sufficiently important in the economy to affect the pricing kernel. 10 First, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) criticize tests of the costly external finance model. Secondly, the costly external finance model's direct implication is that the correlation should only occur for financially constrained firms. In aggregate data this means that the correlation betweeen investment and cash flow should be higher in recessions than in booms. Euler-condition approaches, in which there is an explicit allowance for the possibility of a binding finance constraint (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998). While each of the studies just noted reach the conclusion that that the investment/cash-flow relation is due to agency problems, there are papers that argue that the relation is spurious. Bond and Cummins (2000) argue that using a better proxy for changes in investment opportunities based on analyst growth forecasts eliminates the relation between cash-flow and investment.
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts. The investment series we use is for non-residential fixed investment. We do not consider broader measures of investment, which would include consumer durables such as residential housing, in order to focus on the business investment which is subject to corporate control problems. The cash-flow measure is the net cash-flow of the corporate sector as reported in the NIPA Table 1 .14, and corresponds to the measure of cash-flow commonly used in the investment literature. 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9
Four Quarter Percent Change Inv Cash Flow As documented in the investment literature, the two series are highly correlated (see, for example, Chirinko, 1993 , Caballero, 1999 , or Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988 . But the figure does not suggest any strong asymmetry in the relation between investment and cash-flow across the cycle. Table 1 confirms this statement. We use the NBER's business cycle dates for peaks and troughs, and compute correlations between the investment and cash-flow series separately across expansion periods and contraction periods.
One reconciliation of this evidence is that during booms the type of free-cash-flow frictions we have emphasized are dominant, while during recessions, the costly external finance friction is dominant. Thus, our model provides a more complete picture of the relationship between cash flow and investment. 
Large firms
Our model is best interpreted as applying to large firms that do not face costly external finance frictions, but may have corporate control problems. For these firms, imperfect control implies that overinvestment occurs when they have free cash flow (i.e. during booms). Figure 6 presents investment/cash-flow correlations for disaggregated data. We just study large firms. In each year we take all firms with valid Capex data in Compustat and sort them by book value of assets. The firms with the 100 highest book assets are considered "large" firms. We then compute the correlation between capex-to-total assets and cash-to-total assets for a particular firm-year, and average these correlations across the firms for that year.
The bottom panel of Figure 6 presents the correlation data along with annual GDP growth for the year. There is a trend downward in the correlation data, perhaps reflecting improved corporate governance. The top panel of figure 6 presents the cyclical components of the two data series, extracted using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. From this figure, we note that the correlations do seem to be higher during booms than recessions. The correlation coefficient between the two series pictured is 0.25. 0.10 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 0.05 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 
GDP Growth
Governance and investment
The imperfect control hypothesis suggests that firms will spend their free cash on investments, and that there is more free cash in booms. But, not all firms have the same degree of control imperfections. To study investment data and provide some cross-sectional support for the investment implications of our model we need to find a measure or proxy for the auditing costs, a measure that varies in the cross section. bad governance (dictatorships) are more cyclical than the investment of firms with good governance (democracies). This result is true also controlling for initial leverage. Philippon controls for industry and age of the firm, but the basic finding is suggested by Figure 7 . A boom period starts at the trough of the cycle. In the figure, the two NBER troughs during this period are indicated, and the upswing in the growth rate of GDP in the figure starts at the trough. Notably, the dictatorships' capital expenditure growth rate is high during the first year of the boom, while the democracies are much less so.
None of the above constitutes a test of our imperfect control model; that is left for future research. The evidence, however, is suggestive that large firms with imperfect control behave as the theory suggests and constitute a significant fraction of aggregate investment.
Conclusion
We have studied the effect of imperfect corporate control on asset pricing and investment in a tractable dynamic equilibrium model. In our model, outside investors have limited control over managers and therefore only imperfectly control payout policy. This imperfection allows managers to use their discretion over free cash flow. They always invest as much as they can, consistent with the observation that firms with more cash invest more. Despite the simplicity of the preferences, the results are encouraging. We are able to match some stylized facts concerning the term structure of interest rates, as well the behavior of risk premia. We are also able to match basic macroeconomic facts regarding investment.
For macroeconomics, our results illustrate a novel channel through which financial frictions affects the economy. The literature on financial frictions has for the most part focused on the friction of costly-external-finance (see for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)), as opposed to the free-cash-flow friction we study. It is interesting that the free-cash-flow model also generates amplification and persistence of macroeconomic shocks. However, the propagation mechanisms differ across these two types of frictions. In our model, shocks are propagated through large firms (as opposed to small firms) and during booms (as opposed to downturns). We have also provided evidence that is consistent with the large firm propagation mechanism.
For asset pricing, our results show how the introduction of corporate finance frictions may be fruitful. Although there are alternative existing explanations for all of the asset pricing facts we replicate, it is encouraging that the single free-cash-flow friction has explanatory power for a number of phenomena.
While our goal was to produce a tractable model, the simplicity of the model does lead to some clear failings. As we have mentioned, the price of capital in our model is always one. On the one hand, we know exactly why this occurs in our model. In the CIR model, the price of capital is also fixed at one, and ours is a departure from the CIR model. On the other hand, this means we are unable to address the equity premium puzzle. Moreover, conditional on variables at time t, the Hansen-Jagannathan bound computed from our pricing kernel is tighter in the free-cash-flow model than in the CIR model. That is, σ(m) E(m) is lower under the free-cash-flow kernel. This means that the conditional market risk premium is lower in our model and is certainly a failure of the model. It seems clear that to address the equity premium we will have to depart from log preferences, perhaps to a successful specification such as habit formation.
Our model differs from the endowment economies that are common in the asset pricing literature in that we have explicitly modeled the production side. In a sense, we have tied our hands by modeling both sides of the economy. In a frictionless world, asset prices must also match producers' marginal rate of transformation. Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) show that adding a production sector to a model with habit-formation preferences can reduce risk premia dramatically because investors have strong incentives to use the production side to smooth consumption. A contribution of our paper is to show how corporate finance imperfections may prevent this consumption smoothing.
Finally, there is a great deal of evidence on how variables from the production side of the economy help to explain both the cross-section and time-series of asset returns.
Variables such as size or book-to-market may have something to do with corporate finance imperfections. However, without an explicit model linking corporate financing imperfections with asset prices, it has not been possible to say how. We hope our model is a step towards addressing these issues.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Our solution approach is to guess the value function, then use the guess to arrive at expressions for the optimal controls (C t , d t+1 ), and finally to substitute these controls back into the Bellman equation to verify the guess. Since preferences are log, we make the following guess for the value function:
J(I, ρ) = AlogI + B(ρ).
Let us also make the guess that C t = 
Since,
we can collect the terms on logI t−1 and match coefficients to find that A = To arrive at the expression for the payout policy, return to (29) Given the lemma, θ is independent of time t state variables, which verifies our guess that d t is linear in ρ t . This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
From previous expressions we have that, Taking expectations and then logs we arrive at (22) .
